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This book argues: “any conception of a modern Islamic state is inherently self-
contradictory” (introduction, xi, all quoted emphases as printed) and such a state is 
also “an impossibility” (vix). Professor Hallaq dismisses the last two centuries as 
unworthy models of an Islamic state (chapter 1: “Premises,” p. 2) thereby justifying 
limiting attention to the first 1200 years of Islam. He brackets out the question of 
“what type of political rule are Muslims presently adopting or likely to adopt in the 
future?” (p. 1) as one that “is not integral to our argument and constitutes a separate 
field of enquiry for another book and decidedly for another author” (p. 1). 
 However, logically speaking, how can the last two centuries not be integral -- 
indeed essential -- in assessing whether or not a modern Islamic state is a 
possibility? It might reasonably be thought necessary to investigate how Muslims in 
the modern era have thought and are thinking about ‘Islamic governance,’ and how 
they have attempted or are attempting to fashion anew or to improve the 
governance under which they (and others) are living. Such in any event is not the 
project undertaken in this book. Instead the book’s answer to these questions is that 
the factors rendering the Islamic state a self-contradictory impossibility are entirely 
independent of Muslims and Islam. It claims that the culpable factor is modernity. 
Hallaq understands modernity as a development in European thought and history 
forcefully imposed on the rest of the world. Far from being a critique of Islamism, as 
might first appear, the book is instead a diagnosis of what ails modernity: 
“modernity’s moral predicament” (the third and final term in the book’s subtitle). 
The author evidently takes the view that modernity, which was bad to begin with, is 
now in crisis. In espousing this view Hallaq places himself in the company of critics 
of modernity naming political theorists Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor and 
Charles Larmore. Criticism of the modern state and of the amoral or immoral 
modernity that birthed and raised it appear in each chapter. One key to evaluating 
the book is recognising that the critical edge, the one with teeth, is only applied to 
(this putatively Western) modernity.   
 Setting that general observation aside, the remaining paragraphs of this 
review consider the book‘s attempts to reveal the notional Islamic state as an 
impossible illogicality. Professor Hallaq makes two types of claims in support of this 
conclusion, here classified as ‘the weaker’ and ‘the stronger’. The weaker claim is 
that Muslims cannot opt for an Islamic state now because doing so would be to move 
from a better position (under the rule of sharī‘a pre-dating the modern state) to a 
worse one. Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 make the weaker claim. The stronger claim is that 
the development of Islam over its first 1200 years render it incompatible with the 
modern state. Chapters 2 and 7 make the stronger claim. 
 In the paragraphs that follow, a succinct elaboration of the weaker and the 
stronger claims precedes a chapter by chapter assessment of the support that Hallaq 
gives to each claim. To repeat, the weaker claim is essentially that Muslims cannot 
opt for an Islamic state now, because doing so would represent movement from a 
better position under the rule of Islam and Islamic law to a worse one -- that lot 
being shared by citizens of extant states with their regimes of positivistic laws and 
governments. This claim implies a forced and false choice between the status quo 
and a past ideal, dismissing without consideration possible third alternatives. 
Furthermore ‘cannot’ here denotes not impossibility but rather undesirability.  
 Three chapters reduce to this weaker claim. Chapter 3 rightly indicates the 
flaws inherent in the liberal constitutional doctrine of “Separation of Powers”; it 
represents as preferable the rule of law tradition in Islam. Chapter 4 (“The Legal, the 
Political, and the Moral”) attributes to modern Europe the separation of morality 
from law and the state. It concludes that “Muslims have very little reason to opt for 
the modern state’s law, when they have enjoyed a legal culture that has insisted for 
more than twelve centuries on a law paradigmatically structured and fleshed out by 
an overarching moral source” (p. 89). Chapter 5 (“The Political Subject and Moral 
Technologies of the Self”) asserts that, as compared with Europeans, Muslims lived 
under “a far more egalitarian and merciful system” (p. 110) which was preferable to 
that the modern state offers.  
 Chapter 6 (“Beleaguering Globalization and Moral Economy”) rightly 
observes the encouragement of wealth-seeking and accumulation in Islam (p. 149). 
Nevertheless Hallaq plausibly opines that it would be difficult for Muslims to 
combine the moral imperatives of their faith with capitalism, and in particular with 
the purely profit-seeking modern corporation (p. 154). If -- as Hallaq has committed 
himself to agreeing -- doing so has not been tried, or if it has been tried he has not 
taken account of the result (since such an attempt would have occurred in the last, 
lost two centuries), the beneficial co-existence of Islam and capitalism cannot be 
deemed an impossibility. Far from it. The partnership is trite Islamic law; 
partnerships partially meet the challenge, in addition to possessing some 
advantages over incorporated entities, with respect to corporate governance -- as is 
now increasingly affirmed, and not by Muslims alone. Be that as it may, however 
difficult it might be to check large multi-national companies, the modern state is 
uniquely qualified to police both partnerships and to legislate and adjudicate the 
conditions under which the corporate veil will be removed. Finally, saying that 
something is difficult (as running a state -- Islamic or other --must indubitably be) is 
also to say that it is not impossible. 
 The stronger claim, that regarding the incompatibility of Islam with the 
modern state, may be rephrased as follows: an Islamic state is not possible 
conceptually because modernity requires things of Islam that Islam has never given. 
And that it therefore cannot now give. Both chapter 2 (“The Modern State”), and the 
final chapter, chapter 7 (“The Central Domain of the Moral”) are reducible to this 
claim. Central to the latter chapter is the idea that the subject or subjectivity 
emerging under sharī‘a was completely different to that emerging in Europe (p. 
135). Each of these two chapters make the rudimentary error of ascribing fixity to a 
fluid, contingent and dynamic phenomenon. 
 However it soon becomes apparent that Professor Hallaq does not subscribe 
to the reasoning that he himself has offered in support of the stronger claim. In the 
final section of the last chapter (pp. 167-170) the rigid, fixed dichotomy separating 
Islam, and Western modernity, collapses. Muslims now are portrayed as similar to 
the political and moral philosophers MacIntyre, Taylor and Larmore (p. 169) in that 
they may participate in “subjecting modernity to a restructuring moral critique 
[which] is the most essential requirement not only for the rise of Islamic governance 
but also for our material and spiritual survival” (p. 170). The goals of these political 
theorists and (unnamed) Muslims merge: “[f]or, just as there can be no Islamic 
governance without such a victory, there will be no victory in the first place without 
modernity experiencing a moral awakening” (pp. 169-170). Hallaq calls for a 
dialectic and “a discursive negotiation with – and of – the modern state and its 
liberal values, in both East and West” (p. 168). 
 The position emerging, then, is that Islamic governance is possible. Indeed it 
appears to be a virtual necessity in Hallaq’s opinion; as quoted in the previous 
paragraph, in the event that humanity fails to achieve the conditions precedent to 
Islamic governance then human beings will be rendered both materially and 
spiritually non-existent. The reader should pay close attention to the substitution of 
the term ‘governance’ for the term ‘state’ in the book, and query how well 
governance might respond to the criticisms the book levels at the modern state. For 
an intervention that appears at least sympathetic to post-modernism it is certainly a 
paradox if not an outright contradiction that Hallaq intimates the possibility of what 
can only be called a universal emancipation: subjectivities (European and Islamic) 
change, the interrogated state transforms, law becomes substantively moral, 
humanity escapes the brutality of nationalism, sovereignty, citizenship, capitalism 
and technocratic governance.  
 Hallaq should be applauded both for seeking to write a non-technical book 
accessible to non-specialists and for venturing into what are (for an esteemed 
Arabist and Islamicist) novel areas of modern moral philosophy. Some examples of 
where this bravery may, however, have led to error include the adoption of a legal 
philosophy (positivism) that stops with Kelsen and Austin, ignoring Ronald 
Dworkin; cleaving to a traditional conception of sovereignty and the state or law as 
sovereign that has sustained serious damage from a frontal attack (initiated by 
Eleftheriadis in 2010); emphasizing violence as a source of power or sovereignty (p. 
27) is anachronistic. In fact the necessity of using police powers (or military force) 
betokens underlying weakness: a strong state governs from within – controlling 
behaviour not by physical coercion but by appealing to and shaping the beliefs and 
attitudes of its denizens. 
 Although there is a rigorous clarity to Hallaq’s identification and description 
of the requisites of the modern state (chapter 2), in his treatments of other key 
concepts (post-modernity, subjectivity) there is arguably insufficient clarity. The 
rhetorical flourishes obfuscate. For instance: “The retrieval of Islamic moral 
resources is therefore as much a modern project as modernity itself. And as a 
modern project, it is also postmodern to the core. Postmodernity, let us be clear, 
both assumes and attempts to transcend modernity, but modernity nonetheless” 
(pp. 13-14). This is an opaque formulation, not a clear one: it is a non sequitur to 
conclude that because something is modern it is therefore post-modern. Saying so 
also erodes a distinction essential to the book’s project. More substantively on the 
topic of post-modernity, joint treatments of it and Islam are actually not new -- 
Akbar S. Ahmed, Postmodernism and Islam: Predicament and Promise 2004 is 
relevant yet nowhere referenced. The same is true regarding Islam and globalization 
-- Akbar S. Ahmed (ed) Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity (1994).  
 The corollary of the impossibility of the modern Islamic state turns out to be 
the possibility of the post-modern Islamic state. However the author prefers not to 
articulate this as anything more than an afterthought -- in the last four pages of the 
book. As a result of the author’s reticence it is in the final analysis anything but clear 
what post-modern Islamic governance would be. It is undoubtedly a contribution to 
pose (or even simply to ask again) this question. And it is obvious why Hallaq would 
rather not seek the answers to this question in contemporary assays to form or 
consolidate Islamic states. However, if the reader did not already share Professor 
Hallaq’s disdain for modernity, the reader is exceedingly unlikely to find great 
attraction in the elliptically stated post-modern alternative to it found here; 
irrespective of whether that post-modern alternative is or is not an Islamic 
alternative. 
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